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CASENOTES

Clayton v. Place: Dancing Around
The Establishment Clause-Religion In
The Public Schools

Families entrust public schools with the education of their
children, but condition their trust on the understanding that
the classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious
views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student
and his or her family.
-Justice William Brennan
in Edwards v. Aquillard'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Clayton v. Place the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals faced
the issue of whether a public school board rule which prohibited
social dancing on public school premises was a violation of the
Establishment Clause.' The question was whether a public school
district could prohibit the "wholly secular activity ' 4 of social dancing
on school premises, even though the prohibition was a result of
political participation by religious groups in the community.' This
case implicated the Establishment Clause because it appeared that
influencial religious groups inside a community were using their power
and influence to dictate a public school policy which prohibited an
activity, social dancing, in accord with local religious teachings. 6 It
2

1. 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987). See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
2. 884 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990).

3. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 377-78 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110

S. Ct. 1811 (1990).

4. Id. at 379.

5.Id. at 378.
6. Id. The community involved was Purdy, Missouri. The court of appeals
described Purdy as follows:
Purdy is a small, primarily rural community in southwestern Missouri. The
record indicates religion is an important force in Purdy, and particular
churches are staunchly opposed to social dancing. A tenet of one denomination in Purdy specifically requires "a separation from worldliness, includ-

ing dancing," (citation omitted) and another teaches "social dancing is
Id.

sinful," (citation omitted).
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mattered not that the subject matter of the prohibition was social
dancing. This case was important, in a constitutional sense, because
it presented the question of how far religious groups could go in
making public school policy.
The first amendment of the United States Constitution begins
with the words: "Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of religion." ' 7 This language, known as the Establishment
Clause, was first applied to the states in 1947.8 Over the years the
United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause,
varying between a practical interpretation which allows governmental
accomodation of religion and an interpretation embracing the political
ideal of separation of church and state. 9 In cases such as those
involving financial aid to parochial schools, 0 governmental display of
a Nativity scene in a Christmas display," and opening state legislative
sessions with a prayer, 2 the Court has allowed governmental accomodation of religion. 3 On the other hand, in cases involving governmental action 4 inside the public schools which is tainted by religious
purpose or effect, the Court has built a wall of separation between
5
church and state.'

7. U.S. Const. amend. I.
8. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See infra notes 4146 and accompanying text for a discussion of Everson and of incorporating federal
constitutional rights through the fourteenth amendment and applying such rights to
the states.
9. See generally Mott, The Supreme Court and the Establishment Clause:
From Separation to Accommodation and Beyond, 14 J. L. & EDUC. 111 (1985)
[hereinafter Separation to Accommodation].
10. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Board of Education
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). See also infra
notes 41-76 and accompanying text.
11. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); but see County of Allegheny
v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (1989). See also infra notes 7787 and accompanying text.
12. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). See also infra notes 88-90
and accomapnying text.
13. See infra notes 41-90 and accompanying text.
14. The United States Constitution does not protect individual citizens against
each other. Rather, the Constitution protects individual citizens against the state and
federal governments. Therefore, the Constitution is only implicated if a governmental
body has done something which allegedly violates the limits on government imposed
by the Constitution. Public schools are governmental bodies. Thus, when public
school boards pass and enforce rules, this constitutes "governmental action." Such
''governmental action" must be in conformance with the Constitution.
15. See infra notes 91-104 and accompanying text.
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In Clayton, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit dismissed
a challenge to governmental action inside the public schools of Purdy,
Missouri, where social dancing is prohibited on public school premises. 1 6 The pertinent School Board rule stated: "School dances are not
authorized and school premises shall not be used for the purposes of
conducting a dance.' ' 7 The court of appeals, looking to the face of
the no-dancing rule, applied the controlling three-prong test adopted
in Lemon v. Kurtzman 8 and concluded that the rule did not violate
the Establishment Clause. 9
The court of appeals in Clayton admitted that answering Establishment Clause issues requires mixing the controlling law under
Lemon to the specific facts of the case at hand.20 Nonetheless, the
court separated the specific facts in this case from the legal determination under Lemon by first testing the facial validity of the nodancing rule and thereafter looking at the facts at hand to determine
if such facts required a finding of the rule's unconstitutionality.
In upholding the no-dancing rule, the Eighth Circuit may have
approved the real possibility that local religious majorities could use
their influence in a community to formulate public school policy
which prohibits students from engaging in certain "inappropriate"
conduct. This decision overlooks the fact that religious groups often
use prohibitions of selected conduct as a mechanism of indoctrination.
A clear example of this practice is the Ten Commandments, where
an emphasis was placed on what one "shall not" do as opposed to
what one must do.
It is clear that requiring certain conduct in the public schools,
such as prayer, is a violation of the Establishment Clause. 2' It should
have been equally clear to the Eighth Circuit that prohibiting certain
16. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.

1811 (1990).

17. Id.at 377.
18. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Court adopted a three-part test for determining
whether a challenged governmental action violated the Establishment Clause. The
governmental action had to have a secular, as opposed to a religious, purpose, it
could not have the primary effect of promoting religion, and it could not cause
excessive entanglement between the government and religious organizations. Id. at
612-13.
19. Clayton v. Place, 844 F.2d 376, 381 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1811 (1990).
20. Id.at 378.
21. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). See also infra
notes 93 & 98 and accompanying text.
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conduct, such as social dancing, given the "factual circumstances"
surrounding the no-dancing rule's enforcement, was also a violation
of the Establishment Clause. If a religious majority in Purdy, Missouri
can prohibit social dancing in the public schools of their community,
what is to stop religious majorities in any community from using
government-supported public schools to indoctrinate children by telling them what they "shall not" do? Before Clayton the answer to
this question was the Establishment Clause.
This article will begin by tracing the Establishment Clause from
its roots in colonial America to its application to the states during the
last 43 years. 22 Parts III and IV-A will examine the history and
decision in Clayton v. Place, including an in-depth look at the opinion
of the court of appeals. 23 Parts IV-B and IV-C will analyze that
court's opinion and discuss the implications of allowing religious
majorities in individual communities to influence local public school
boards in decisions which are seemingly secular, but can be religiously
significant under certain circumstances.2 The importance of properly
applying the controlling law to the specific circumstances in each case
will be discussed along with the suggested application of a "but for"
analysis, in conjunction with the Lemon test, in Establishment Clause
cases. 25 By utilizing such an analysis, the courts may be more easily
able to determine the real purpose underlying governmental activity
challenged on Establishment Clause grounds.
II.
A.

THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

THE COLONIES

The issue of whether there should be a separation of church and
state was a common topic of discussion in the American colonies
prior to the Declaration of Independence and the adoption of the
first amendment to the United States Constitution. 26 The settlement
of the American colonies by different and distinct religious groups
27
led to conflict concerning governmental establishment of religion.
22. See infra notes 26-104 and accomapnying text.
23. See infra notes 105-162 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 163-241 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 242-52 and accomapnying text.
26. See generally Swift, To Insure Domestic Tranquility: The Establishment
Clause of the FirstAmendment, 16 HoFsTRA L. REv. 473 (1988) [hereinafter Domestic
Tranquility].
27. Id.
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The question then, as it is now, was whether the majority should be
able to use their hold on governmental institutions to promote their
own religious beliefs in disregard of the beliefs of minority religious
groups. 28 One of the reasons many settlers came to America was to
avoid the limitations on religious freedom which governmental establishment of religion caused in other parts of the world.29 Thus, many
colonists were determined to create a relationship between church and
state which would allow the free exercise of religion by prohibiting
the establishment of a state church. 0
Individual colonies initially approached the problems caused by
religious plurality in different ways. Some colonies, such as Virginia,
Massachusetts, and Connecticut, ignored the problems and established
state churches which were supported through taxation. 3 Others, like
New York and Maryland, took a more moderate approach by allowing
tax revenue to be distributed to various churches in place of establishing a single state church.3 2 Still others, including Rhode Island and
Pennsylvania, favored separation of church and state.33 Throughout
the eighteenth century, the push for disestablishment of religion gained
momentum so that by the time of the American Revolution, govern4
ment participation in religious practice had almost no support.1
The pre-Revolution debate over governmental establishment of
religion resulted in post-Independence laws and constitutional provisions throughout the colonies that adopted, as a political ideal, the
separation of church and state." In opposition to continuing a general
tax assessment for all religions in Virginia, James Madison wrote:
"We remonstrate against the said Bill ....

Because it will destroy

that moderation and harmony which the forbearance of our laws to
intermeddle with Religion has produced among its several sects. "36
He proposed "that no man or class of men ought, on account of
religion to be invested with peculiar emoluments or privileges." 37
During the first part of the nineteenth century the political forces
favoring disestablishment had won out in the newly formed American
28. Id. at 476-77.
29. Id. at 478.
30. See generally Domestic Tranquility, supra note 26.
31. Id. at 484.
32. Id. at 481.
33. Id. at 484.
34. See generally Domestic Tranquility, supra note 26.
35. Id. at 492.
36. J. Madison, MemorialRemonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1795),
reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 82-83 (1987).
37.

1. BRANT,

JAMES MADISON: THE VwGINIA REVOLUTIONIST 245

(1941).
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states." At the national level, the Establishment Clause, as adopted
in the first amendment of the Federal Constitution, was first applied
to the states in 1947.19 Since then the United States Supreme Court
has had to balance the sometimes realistic need for governmental
accommodation of religion with the constitutional ideal of separation
of church and state.4 The following two sections will examine the
United States Supreme Court's approach to Establishment Clause
cases: first by looking at how the Court has allowed governmental
accommodation of religion and second, by reviewing cases involving
the public schools where the Court has maintained a wall of separation
between church and state.
B.

ACCOMMODATION AND THE ADOPTION OF THE LEMON TEST

The first Supreme Court case sanctioning governmental accommodation of religion was Everson v. Board of Education,41 decided
in 1947. In Everson, the Court incorporated 42 the Establishment
Clause of the first amendment into the fourteenth amendment, and
upheld a New Jersey statute authorizing the use of public funds to
reimburse parents for the costs of transporting their children to public
as well as parochial schools. 43 A taxpayer challenged the statute
because it reimbursed parents of children who attended sectarian
schools. 44 The Court viewed the reimbursement as a legitimate public
safety measure, as opposed to an advancement of religious institutions. 45 It reasoned that spending public funds to insure that all
38. See Domestic Tranquility, supra note 26, at 499-500.
39. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See infra notes 4146 and accompanying text. Prior to the passage of the fourteenth amendment, the
United States Supreme Court refused to apply the Bill of Rights to the states. These

were rights held against the national or federal government and not against the states.
However, after the fourteenth amendment was passed, the Court selectively incorporated those provisions of the Bill of Rights which it determined were fundamental
to the American judicial system into the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Since it was clear that the fourteenth amendment limited state governmental power, any federal rights incorporated into the fourteenth amendment were
also limits on state governmental power. In 1947, the Court decided that the
Establishment Clause should be applied to state governments. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, Co sTnUTONAL LAW §§ 10-2, 11-6 (3d ed. 1986).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See generally Separation to Accommodation, supra note 9.
330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 3 (1947).
Id.
Id.at 17.
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children, regardless of their religion, arrived safely at school was a
constitutional manner of protecting the general welfare.4
Another example of permissible accommodation of religion was
found in McGowan v. Maryland,47 decided in 1961, which upheld
Sunday Closing Laws. These laws, with various exceptions, prohibited
generally all labor, business and other commercial activities on Sundays.4 The Court found that, although the statutes originally had a
religious purpose, they had taken on a secular significance over the
years in designating a day of rest for all citizens.4 9 Seven years later,
in 1968, the Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a
New York statute that required public school districts to provide stateapproved textbooks to parochial schools in Board of Education v.
Allen.5 0 The Court found that the purpose of the statute was to
further educational opportunity for the young and that the books
benefited parents and children and not the institutions in which the
children studied. 5'
In Allen, Justice White elaborated on a test proposed by Justice
52
Clark five years earlier in School District of Abington v. Schempp
46. Id. at 18.
47. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). The defendants were convicted of violating MD. ANN.
CODE, art. 27 sec. 521, which prohibited the sale of all merchandise except tobacco
products, confectionaries, milk, bread, fruits, gasoline, oils, greases, drugs, medicines,
newspapers, and periodicals. The defendants had sold a toy, floor wax, a lose-leaf
binder, and a stapler. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 422-23 (1961).
48. Id. at 422.
49. Id. at 444. The Court stated:
In light of the evolution of our Sunday Closing Laws through the centuries,
and of their more or less recent emphasis upon secular considerations, it is
not difficult to discern that as presently written and administered, most of
them, at least, are of a secular rather than of a religious character, and that
presently they bear no relationship to establishment of religion as those
words are used in the Constitution of the United States.
Id.
50. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). Section 701 of the Education Law of the State of New
York required local public school boards to buy textbooks and lend them without
charge to all students, including those attending private schools, in grades seven
through twelve. Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238-39 (1968).
51. Id. at 243-44. The Court stated:
The law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general
program to lend school books free of charge. Books are furnished at the
request of the pupil and ownership remains, at least technically, in the State.
Thus no books or funds are furnished to parochial schools, and the financial
benefit is to parents and children, not to schools.
Id.
52. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding unconstitutional a state law that required
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which asked: what is the purpose and primary effect of the governmental enactment?53 In order to pass scrutiny under the Establishment
Clause, the enactment had to have a secular purpose and the effect
could neither advance nor inhibit religion. 4 In 1970, the Court added
a third prong to this secular-purpose-primary-effect inquiry in Walz
v. Tax Commission.5 5 The third prong asked whether the challenged
act caused "excessive government entanglement with religion. '"36 Allowing excessive entanglement between church and state would contradict the underlying political ideal of prohibiting the government
from actively involving itself in religious activity." While the question
of excessiveness is one of degree, when government involvement with
religion "is a continuing one calling for official and continuing
surveillance," the result will be an impermissible entanglement between church and state.5"
In 1971, the Court officially adopted this three-prong test in
Lemon v. Kurtzman59 to deal with Establishment Clause cases. Thus,
in order for a challenged governmental action to conform with the
Establishment Clause, the action must have a valid secular purpose,
its principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion, and the action must not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with religion.6° Under this test a challenged act
must pass all three prongs in order to be constitutionally permissible. 6'
Bible readings at the beginning of each day in the public schools with a provision
allowing students to be excused from such sessions upon written request from their
parents or guardian).
53. School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
54. Id. at 222-23.

55. 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (state tax exemption for religious institutions held
constitutional; tax exemption supports free exercise of religion and furthers separation
of church and state by restricting their fiscal relationship).
56. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
57. Id. at 668.

58. Id. at 674-75.
59. 403 U.S. 602, 612-14 (1971) (Rhode Island law allowing a fifteen percent
salary supplement to nonpublic school teachers paid from public funds, and a
Pennsylvania law which allowed direct reimbursement to nonpublic schools for
"secular educational services," including reimbursements for the costs of teachers'
salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials, held to be a violation of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause; the resulting state-church relationship
caused by the laws involved excessive government entanglement in religion).
60. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
61. Id. at 613-14. The Court's finding that the purposes of the challenged
legislation were permissible but that they caused excessive governmental entanglement
with religion indicated that a failure under any one of the three prongs of the test
resulted in a ruling of unconstitutionality.

1990:119]

CLA YTON V. PLACE

In addition to this basic three part inquiry, the Court has at
times included a political divisiveness component within the third
prong of the Lemon test which asks whether governmental action is
likely to create political divisiveness along religious lines. 62 The question of political divisiveness, however, is limited to cases where direct
financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or to teachers in
parochial schools.6 3 As such, political divisiveness was not at issue in
Clayton, where the challenged action involved only public schools.6
Since 1971, the Court has used the Lemon test in Establishment
Clause cases and has continued to allow governmental accommodation
of religion when the governmental action involved has a valid secular
purpose, neither advances nor inhibits religion in its primary effect,
and does not foster excessive government entanglement in religion.6 5
Indeed, the Court has demonstrated a strong willingness to approve
of government cooperation with, and accommodation of, religion in
certain circumstances."
A good example of the Court's application of the Lemon test is
Mueller v. Allen, 67 a case where governmental accomodation of relig62. See Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 373-85 (1975) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part, urging the use of a fourth factor that would look at
the political divisiveness which state aid to religious institutions would produce).
63. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617 n.14 (1988). See also infra note 80
and accompanying text.
64. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 379 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1811 (1990) (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617 n.14 (upholding federal
legislation which provided grants to various groups, some of which were religious or
that had institutional ties to religious organizations)); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,
403 n.11 (1983) (upholding a Minnesota statute which allowed taxpayers to deduct
expenses incurred in providing tuition, textbooks and transportation for children
attending both public and sectarian schools); Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center,
857 F.2d 448, 456 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1096 (1989) (holding that it
was constitutional for a county hospital to hire a chaplain to do clinical, wholistic
counseling of patients and their families and also to provide nonreligious counseling
for hospital employees); Florey v. Sioux Falls School District 49-5, 619 F.2d 1311,
1318 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980) (holding constitutional a school
board's policy and rules allowing the observance of holidays having both a religious
and secular basis; the court concluded that the observance of the religious basis for
the holidays was a secular activity in that the study and recognition of religion in the
public schools is not prohibited)).
65. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
66. See infra notes 67-90 and accompanying text. The Court is not always
willing to accommodate religion. In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 127
(1982), the Court struck a Massachusetts law which gave churches and schools the
power to veto liquor licenses.
67. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11

ion was allowed. In Mueller, a Minnesota statute allowed taxpayers
to deduct expenses incurred in providing tuition, textbooks and transportation for their children attending elementary and secondary
school. 68 This deduction applied not only to expenses incurred for
public school education but also applied to people who sent their
children to private or sectarian schools. 69 In upholding the law, the
Court found that the statute passed all three prongs of the Lemon
test.7 0
First, the Court found a secular purpose in that: 1) the State had
a secular interest in ensuring that its populace was educated; 2) there
was a strong public interest in assisting the continuation of private
education since such schools educated a large portion of the children
in the State, thus taking the burden and expense off of the public
school system to do so; and 3) private schools promoted healthy
7
competition with the public schools. '
Second, in concluding that the statute had neither the effect of
advancing nor inhibiting religion, the Court found: 1) Minnesota
allowed many other tax deductions, including ones for charitable
contributions to religious institutions; 2) this deduction applied to all
parents, not only those with children in private schools; 3) the benefit
involved was conferred upon the parents, not the religious institutions;
and 4) any unequal effect of the deductions favoring parents with
children in private schools could be considered a return for the benefits
72
private schools provided to the State and its taxpayers.
Third, the Court found that the only source of governmental
entanglement by the State in religion involved in the case was the
State's need to disqualify certain religious books and materials from
the tax deduction. 73 The Court concluded that this was not excessive
governmental entanglement in religion. 74 Furthermore, the Court
pointed out that the political divisiveness component of the third
prong did not apply because that inquiry is limited to cases where
direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or to teachers
in parochial schools. 7 Because there was no financial subsidy paid

68.
69.
70.
71.

72.
73.
74.
75.

Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 391 (1983).
Id. at 392.
Id. at 394-403.
Id. at 394-95.

Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 396-402 (1983).
Id. at 403.
Id.
Id. at 403 n. 11.
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directly to any parochial school, the political divisiveness inquiry did
76
not apply.
Other post-Lemon accommodation cases included Lynch v.
Donnelly7 7 where the Court decided that the inclusion of a Nativity
scene as part of a Christmas display erected by the city in a park
owned by a nonprofit organization, passed all three prongs of the
Lemon test. 78 The Court found that the Nativity scene, within the
context of the entire display, had acquired a secular meaning in its
depiction of the origins of a nationally celebrated holiday. 79 In Bowen
v. Kendrick,10 decided in 1988, the Court upheld federal legislation

which provided grants to various groups, some of which were religious

or that had institutional ties to religious organizations."' These grants

were to be used for research and services in the area of premarital
adolescent sexual relations and pregnancy.

2

Most recently, the Court

in 1989, faced once again with a Christmas display case, decided in

County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union" that the
display of a Nativity scene in a county courthouse violated the
Establishment Clause while the display of a Chanukah menorah along

with a Christmas tree just outside a city-county Building was found
to be permissible.8 In distinguishing the Nativity scene here from the
76. Id.

77. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
78. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). The Christmas display
included a Santa Clause house, reindeer, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree,
carolers, figures of clowns, elephants, and a teddy bear, colored lights, a banner
reading "SEASONS GREETINGS," and a creche. The creche, a part of the display
for over forty years, is made up of an Infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph, angels,
shepherds, kings, and animals. Id. at 671.
79. Id. at 679-80.
80. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
81. The Adolescent Family Life Act authorized grants for public and private
organizations which offered certain services, including counseling and education
concerning adolescent sexuality, and prohibited the use of funds for family planning
services or to promote abortion. The Act recognized the need for cooperation between
religious, charitable, and voluntary organizations and the government in dealing with
such problems. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593-97 (1988).
82. Id. at 593.
83. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
84. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086,
3104, 3115 (1989). The creche consisted of the Infant Jesus, Mary, Joseph, farm
animals, shepherds, wise men, and a banner reading "Gloria in Excelsis Deo,"
interpreted by the Court to mean glory to God for the birth of Jesus. The menorah
was displayed along with a 45-foot Christmas tree and a sign bearing the name of
the Mayor of Pittsburgh. The sign was titled "Salute to Liberty" and the following
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display of the menorah and the display of the Nativity scene in Lynch,
the Court emphasized the importance of viewing the displays in their
overall context to determine if the government was recognizing Christmas as a cultural phenomenon or if the government was endorsing a
particular religious message. 5 The display of the creche in Lynch and
the display of the menorah in County of Allegheny were only single
parts of a larger display which included other secular figures and
objects, such as a Christmas tree.16 Because the creche at the county
courthouse in County of Allegheny stood alone, the Court concluded
that its message was undeniably religious. 7
Perhaps the strongest example of the Court's willingness to
8
accommodate religion in certain situations was Marsh v. Chambers."
This case, decided in 1983, involved the Nebraska legislature's longstanding practice of hiring a chaplain to open the legislature's session
with a prayer. The Court declined to apply the Lemon criteria, quite
possibly in order to avoid striking down the longstanding practice of
such religious activity inside the seat of State government. 9 The Court
supported its conclusion that the practice was permissible by pointing
to history and the fact that the First Congress itself was opened with
a prayer. 90 Marsh, as well as these other post-Lemon cases, are
indicative of the Court's continued recognition of the practical need
for governmental accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
C.

SEPARATION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Though the Court has allowed governmental accommodation in
many situations, the Court has been unwilling to allow accommodation of religion inside the public schools. 91 This section will illustrate
how the Court has carefully scrutinized cases involving Establishment
Clause challenges to governmental actions actually taking place within
statement appeared under the title: "During this holiday season, the city of Pittsburgh

salutes liberty. Let these festive lights remind us that we are the keepers of the flame
of liberty and our legacy of freedom." Id. at 3094-95, 3103.
85. Id. at 3103-04.
86. Id. at 3103-15.
87. Id. at 3104.
88. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
89. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). The opinion of the Court never
mentioned the Lemon test.
90. Id. at 792. The Court stated: "In light of the unambiguous and unbroken
history of more than 200 years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening
legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our society." Id.
91. See infra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
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the physical confines of the public schools. The Court has been
particularly wary of attempts by government to use the public schools
for religious indoctrination.
In its first public school case involving the Establishment Clause,
the Court in 1948 struck down an Illinois statute which allowed local
clergy to give religious instruction to participating students inside
public school classrooms during school hours. 92 About fifteen years
later, the Court struck down state-sponsored prayer in the public
schools in two separate cases in 1962 and 1963. 93 Later, in 1968, the
Court held in Epperson v. Arkansas that an Arkansas statute that
prohibited the teaching of evolution in the public schools violated the
Establishment Clause. The Court found there that the sole reason for
the prohibition was that the theory of evolution conflicted with the
beliefs of a particular religious group that accepted humanity's origin
as portrayed in the Book of Genesis. 95
In more recent years, the Court has continued to maintain a
"wall of separation between church and state" in cases involving
challenged action inside the public schools. In 1980, the Court held a
statute unconstitutional in Stone v. Graham,9 which ordered the
posting of the Ten Commandments in every public school classroom
in the state.Y In 1985, the Court struck down a statute which
authorized a one-minute period of silence in all public schools for
meditation or voluntary prayer. 98 In the same year, the Court invalidated two Michigan programs which allowed the expenditure of public
92. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). Compare Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding a program which offered public school
students religious instruction given outside school premises).
93. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (recitation of denominationally neutral
prayer "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg
Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country" at the beginning
of each day in the public schools held unconstitutional) and Abington School District
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
94. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
95. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968). The Court stated:
The overriding fact is that Arkansas' law selects from the body of knowledge
a particular segment which it proscribes for the sole reason that it is deemed
to conflict with a particular religious doctrine; that is, with a particular
interpretation of the Book of Genesis by a particular religious group.

Id.

96. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
97. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
98. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). Alabama Statute, sec. 16-1-20.1
authorized a one minute period of silence in all the public schools for meditation or
voluntary prayer. Id. at 40.
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funds to provide supplemental classes to nonpublic school students.9

The additional courses were taught by teachers hired by the public

school system and the lessons were given in classrooms at the non-

public schools which were rented at public expense.100 The Court held
that the programs violated the Establishment Clause because they had
the primary effect of advancing religion in that such involvement by
government in the activities of religious institutions was impermissible.101
Finally, in Edwards v. Aguillard,0 2 decided in 1987, the Court
struck down a Louisiana statute that prohibited the teaching of
evolution in the public schools unless such instruction was accompanied by the teaching of creation science. 03 Justice Brennan, in delivering the opinion of the Court, summarized the Court's concern
regarding cases involving the Establishment Clause and the public
schools:
States and local school boards are generally afforded considerable discretion in operating public schools. At the same time
we have necessarily recognized that the discretion of the
States and local school boards in matters of education must
be exercised in a manner that comports with the transcendent
imperatives of the First Amendment. The Court has been
particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools. Families
entrust public schools with the education of their children, but
condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom
99. School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
Both programs used public money to educate nonpublic school students in nonpublic
school classrooms. Forty of forty-one schools involved in the programs were religious
schools. The first program, the Shared Time program, offered supplementary "core
curriculum" courses in math, reading, art, music, and physical education taught by
full-time employees of the public schools. The second program under attack, the
Community Education program, offered classes in arts and crafts, home economics,
Spanish, gymnastics, yearbook production, Christmas arts and crafts, drama, newspaper, humanities, chess, model building, and nature appreciation to adults and
children and were taught after regular school hours by part-time public school
employees. Id. at 375-77.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 385-97.
102. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). Louisiana's "Creationism Act" required that if the
theory of evolution were taught in the public schools, "creation science" must also
be taught. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 581 (1987).
103. The "Creationism Act" did not require either subject to be taught, but it
made it impossible to teach one without teaching the other. Id.
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will not be purposely used to advance religious views that may
conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her
family. Students in such institutions are impressionable and
their attendance is involuntary.1°4

Thus, it is apparent that the Court has retained the practice of erecting
a wall of strict separation between church and state in the public
schools. In applying the Establishment Clause to the states since 1947,
the Court has consistently cast a suspicious eye upon state action
within the public schools which has come under attack for violating
the Federal Constitution. Once again governmental action inside the
public schools was at issue in Clayton. The next section will look
specifically at that case.
III.
A.

CLAYTON V. PLACE: THE HISTORY OF THE CASE

THE CHALLENGED GOVERNMENTAL ACTION

In Purdy, Missouri, public school students are not allowed to
05
hold homecoming dances or prom dances on school premises.' This
is the result of a School Board policy which prohibits'dancing in the
public schools.'°6 Having failed to convince the School Board in Purdy
to change this policy, the plaintiffs'07 brought suit in the appropriate
federal district court claiming that the no-dancing policy violated: (1)
the Freedom of Association Clause of the first amendment; (2) the
Freedom of Speech Clause of the first amendment; (3) the Establishment Clause of the first amendment; and (4) article I, section 7 of
the Missouri Constitution.' °0 The district court rejected the first two
claims but found that the no-dancing rule violated the Establishment
Clause as well as the Missouri Constitution.'.

9

104. Id. at 583-84.
105. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 377 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1811 (1990).
106. Id.
107. The plaintiffs in Clayton were students, parents, and taxpayers; defendants
were the Purdy R-2 School District, its Superintendent, and members of the District's
Board of Education. See Clayton, 884 F.2d at 377.
108. Id. at 378. Article I, section 7 of the Missouri Constitution states:
That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or
indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid
of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no
preference shall be given to, nor any discrimination made against, any
church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship.
Mo. Const. art. I, § 7.
109. Clayton, 884 F.2d at 378.
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The rule in question was Purdy R-2 School District Rule 502.29
which stated: "School dances are not authorized and school premises
shall not be used for the purposes of conducting a dance.""' 0 This
rule had been in effect for longer than any of the parties could
remember and there was no record of its enactment."' Purdy is a
small, rural town and the religious groups there have important
influence in the community." 2 One of these religious groups teaches
that social dancing is sinful and another requires "separation from
wordliness, including dancing."" 3
B.

ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE THE NO-DANCING RULE

On January 9, 1978, student council representatives and class
representatives asked the School Board if it would allow students to
hold dances on school premises. '4 The School Board voted against
allowing dances and one of the members who voted in favor of
allowing dances at the school was subsequently voted out of office." 5
In October, 1984, students approached the Purdy School District
Superintendent, who favored allowing dances at the public schools,
and requested permission to have a homecoming dance." 6 During
preliminary discussion amongst Board members, concerns were raised
regarding possible controversy in the community if dances were
allowed at school, lack of community support for changing the nodancing policy, and potential problems with chaperoning school
dances. 17 These concerns resulted in no School Board action." 8
Again, during the 1985-86 school year, there was an attempt to
change the no-dancing policy. In February, 1986, a newly formed
110. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 377 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1811 (1990).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 378.
113. Id. at 378 (citing Clayton v. Place, 690 F. Supp. 850, 856 (W.D. Mo.
1988), rev'd, 884 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990)). A
tenet of the Purdy Free Will Baptist Church is that social dancing is sinful and a
tenet of the Purdy Assembly of God religion is a separation from worldliness which
includes social dancing. Id.
114. Clayton v. Place, 690 F. Supp. 850, 852 (W.D. Mo. 1988), rev'd, 884 F.2d
376 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1811 (1990).
115. Id.
116. Id. In response to questioning concerning the no-dancing rule, Superintendent Place stated "why should this surprise you, this is a conservative, religious

community."
117. Id.

118. Id.
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chapter of Students Against Drunk Driving attended the School Board
meeting to ask the Board to reconsider the no-dancing policy so that
their group could sponsor a dance on school premises." 9 A local
minister in attendance requested that discussion on changing the rule
be postponed until the March School Board meeting and the request
was granted. 20
C. THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE SURVIVAL OF THE POLICY

The March 1986 meeting set the stage for a political showdown
over the no-dancing rule. Prior to the March Board meeting, several
Board members suggested religious reasons for disfavoring changing
the rule' 2 ' and various local ministers forming the "Ministerial
Alliance'1 2 met to plan a presentation in support of the no-dancing
policy. 23 The ministers also encouraged their congregations to attend
the March meeting and oppose changing the rule.'2
About 250-400 people attended the March meeting. 25 Several
presentations concerning the dancing issue were given, including the
reading of a letter from the "Ministerial Alliance," but "no direct
mention was made of religion per se at the meeting.' ' 26 When the
minister representing the "Ministerial Alliance" ended his presentation, he asked those present who opposed changing the no-dancing
policy to stand and the "overwhelming majority" did so. 27 The
119. Clayton v. Place, 690 F. Supp. 850, 852 (W.D. Mo. 1988), rev'd, 884 F.2d
376 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990); see also Clayton v. Place,
884 F.2d 376, 378 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990).
120. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 378 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.

Ct. 1811 (1990).
121. Clayton v. Place, 690 F. Supp. 850, 852-53 (W.D. Mo. 1988), rev'd, 884
F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990). School Board President
Glen Garrett stated, "you'd better hope there's never separation of God and school."
Board member Terry said that he would vote in favor of keeping the rule because
when he voted to rescind the rule in the past he caught a good deal of "flak" from
the ministers. Board member Keeling stated that he was taught dancing was wrong
and thus supported the no-dancing rule and Board member Negre acknowledged that
his church did not approve of dancing.
122. Id. at 853. The "Ministerial Alliance" included ministers from the First
Baptist, the First Christian, the First Free Will Baptist, the First Assembly of God,
and the Macedonia Baptist Churches.
123. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 378 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1811 (1990).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 378 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1811 (1990).
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School Board, though no formal vote was taken, unanimously agreed
in closed session to continue to prohibit social dancing on school
2
premises. 1
Regardless of the School District's no-dancing rule, Purdy students have been able to hold dances off of school premises and
regularly do so. 29 Also, during the last 12 years prior to this litigation,
a banquet for juniors and seniors had been held with teachers as
chaperons, sometimes on school premises. If a prom dance followed
the banquet, it had to be held off of school grounds and teachers
could not participate nor could the school provide funding for the
event. 30
On April 18, 1986, in an effort to circumvent the no-dancing
rule, one of the plaintiffs filed an application to rent space at the
Purdy Elementary School to hold a dance. After receiving the application, the School Board suspended its previously existing rental policy
for nonschool functions on school premises. However, school grounds
had been subsequently used for nonschool softball leagues, basketball
games, and an exhibition donkey basketball game.'
Having lost in the political arena, the plaintiffs turned to the
courts to have the no-dancing rule declared unconstitutional.3 2 The
district court agreed with the plaintiffs, but the court of appeals
reversed, holding that the School District's no-dancing rule was not
an unconstitutional establishment of religion under the first amendment.' 33 A discussion of the latter court's decision follows.
IV.
A.

UPHOLDING THE No-DANCING RULE

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

The court of appeals began by applying the Lemon criteria to
test the constitutionality of the no-dancing policy. Under Lemon, the
challenged governmental action must: 1) have a secular purpose; 2)
neither advance nor inhibit religion in its principal or primary effect;
and 3) not foster an excessive entanglement with religion. 3 4 The text
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Clayton v. Place, 690 F. Supp. 850, 854 (W.D. Mo. 1988), rev'd, 884 F.2d
376 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990).
131. Id. at 853-54.
132. Id.
133. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 381 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1811 (1990).
134. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (cited in Clayton v. Place, 884
F.2d 376, 379 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990)).
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of the no-dancing rule stated: "School dances are not authorized and
school premises shall not be used for purposes of conducting a
dance."' 3 5 The Eighth Circuit looked only to the face of the rule in
applying this test and concluded that the rule was valid under each
36
prong.
In applying the first prong of the Lemon test, the court of appeals
had to determine if the rule had a valid secular purpose. 37 In applying
the purpose prong of the test to the no-dancing rule, the court of
appeals dismissed the district court's conclusion that the rule had no
secular purpose. 3 The court found that extracurricular dancing was
a "wholly secular activity," the rule had no religious component in
its text and, being that there was no record of the rule's enactment,
there was no evidence that the rule was enacted with a religious
purpose. 13 9 Thus, the court concluded that the no-dancing rule was
facially valid under the purpose prong of the test since it was simply
a permissible regulation of a secular activity.140
Under the second prong of the Lemon test, the question arose
whether the no-dancing rule had the principal or primary effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion. Addressing the effect prong of the
Lemon test, the Eighth Circuit again disagreed with the conclusion of
the district court. '4' The district court had concluded that the prohibition against dancing "advances the tenets of one group of religion. " 42 On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit found that the School
Board's enforcement of the rule did not have the principal or primary
effect of advancing any religious doctrine. 43 The court noted that the
students were not "prohibited from engaging in or refraining from
extracurricular dancing" outside of school premises and "any arguably religious effect of the rule [was] indirect, remote, and incidental.' 1 44 Meeting the contention of the plaintiffs that the rule

Ct.

Ct.
376
Ct.

135. Id. at 377.
136. Id. at 379.
137. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 379 (8th Cir.
1811 (1990).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 379 (8th Cir.
1811 (1990).
142. Clayton v. Place, 690 F. Supp. 850, 856 (W.D.
(8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990).
143. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 379 (8th Cir.
1811 (1990).
144. Id. at 379.

1989), cert. denied, 110 S.

1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Mo. 1988), rev'd, 884 F.2d
1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
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"impermissibly endorses or conveys a message of governmental preference for a particular religious viewpoint," the court of appeals,
again looking to the text of the rule, disagreed and quoted County of
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union'4 in finding that the
School District had not "taken a position on questions of religious
belief or ... made adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a
person's standing in the political community."' 46
Finally, the court examined the third inquiry under Lemon,
namely, whether the no-dancing rule fostered an excessive entanglement of government with religion. 47 The district court had found that
the no-dancing rule failed the third prong of the Lemon test because
the rule caused political divisiveness.',4 The court of appeals dismissed
this conclusion by pointing out that the political divisiveness component of the third prong of the Lemon test applies only in cases
involving financial aid to parochial schools. 49 Because Clayton did
not involve the payment of financial aid to parochial schools or
teachers in parochial schools, the political divisiveness inquiry did not
50
apply.
As for the excessive governmental entanglement component of
the third prong, the Eighth Circuit found that, if, as the plaintiffs
contend, social dancing was a religiously significant event, the prohibition against dances on school premises lessened, rather than increased, governmental entanglement in religious affairs."' In other
words, if dancing was a religious event, and if school policy prohibited
such religious activity on school premises, the no-dancing rule reduced
rather than fostered government entanglement with religion. 5 2
Having concluded that the no-dancing rule was permissible under
all three prongs of the Lemon test, the court of appeals proceeded to
145. 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3101 (1989). See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
146. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 379 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1811 (1990) (quoting County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,
109 S. Ct. 3086, 3101 (1989)).
147. Id.
148. Clayton v. Place, 690 F. Supp. 850, 856 (W.D. Mo. 1988), rev'd, 884 F.2d
376 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1811 (1990).
149. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 379 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1811 (1990).
150. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617 n.14 (1988) ("question of 'political
divisiveness' should be 'regarded as confined to cases where direct financial subsidies
are paid to parochial schools or to teachers in parochial schools' ") (quoting Mueller
v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 404 n.ll (1983)).
151. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 379 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1811 (1990).
152. Id.
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discredit plaintiffs' remaining contention that the School Board acted
unconstitutionally when it allowed the religious beliefs of the majority
to dictate school policy.' The district court had agreed with this
argument and found that the no-dancing rule was inherently religious,
that the rule had no valid secular purpose, that the primary effect of
the rule was to endorse the particular religious beliefs of a group that
felt social dancing was sinful, and that the School Board "in keeping
the rule abandoned neutrality with the intent to promote a particular
view in religious matters."'15 4 While accepting the facts as determined
by the district court, the Eighth Circuit could not agree with that
court's conclusions of law.'
The Eighth Circuit accepted the district court's findings that
School Board members were not telling the truth when they testified
that their decision to keep the no-dancing rule was motivated by
moral, educational, or fiscal concerns and not by religion, but rejected
the conclusion that these findings invalidated the rule. 5 6 "The mere
fact a governmental body takes action that coincides with the principles or desires of a particular religious group, however, does not
transform the action into an impermissible establishment of relig57
ion.''1
In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals pointed out that
public officials are not required to "check at the door whatever
religious background (or lack of it) they carry with them before they
act on rules that are otherwise unobjectionable under the controlling
Lemon standards."'5 8 It also pointed out that religious groups may
work to influence secular decisions and should not be denied the
benefits of such efforts. 5 9 In sum, the Eighth Circuit found it
unrealistic to expect the School Board members to abandon their
religious beliefs and unfair to deny religious groups an opportunity
to affect governmental decisionmaking, especially since the challenged
rule was constitutionally permissible under the established Lemon

criteria. 160

153. Id.at 380-81.
154. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 380 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1811 (1990) (quoting Clayton v. Place, 690 F. Supp. 850, 855 (W.D. Mo. 1988),
rev'd, 884 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1989)).
155. Id.

156. Id.
157. Id.

158. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 380 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1811 (1990).

159. Id. at 380-81.
160. Id.
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In concluding the decision, the Eight Circuit adopted the district
court's treatment of section 7 of the Missouri Constitution as coextensive with the federal Establishment Clause and likewise reversed
the district court's conclusion that the no-dancing rule violated the
Missouri Constitution. 6' In dicta, the court of appeals suggested that
the plaintiffs' remedy in having the no-dancing rule changed was at
the ballot box and not in the courts. 62 A closer look at the facts in
the Clayton case and the controlling Lemon criteria suggests the
contrary.
B.

MIXING THE FACTS AND THE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CASE

The structure of the Eighth Circuit's analysis in Clayton was twopart. First, it applied the Lemon criteria to the text of the no-dancing
rule and concluded that the rule was valid on its face. 63 Second, the
court of appeals, having already concluded that the no-dancing rule
was constitutional on its face, dismissed any claim that the particular
circumstances surrounding the existence of the rule compelled a
finding of unconstitutionality.' This, in effect, raised a presumption
of the rule's constitutionality before the specific facts of the Clayton
case were examined.' 65 Stated another way, the court of appeals
answered the pertinent questions of law, namely, whether the nodancing rule on its face was constitutional, before addressing the
relevant factual issues particular to the case at bar.
Without looking beyond the face of the rule, it was impossible
to truly determine under Lemon whether the rule had a valid secular
purpose, or if it advanced or inhibited religion, or if it fostered
excessive entanglement with religion since, as the court of appeals
admitted, the Lemon inquiry here involved a mixed question of fact
and law.'" Legal scholars have struggled with distinguishing questions
of fact from questions of law. James Bradley Thayer concluded that
161. Id. at 381. This note has not addressed the Missouri constitutional question

due to both the district court's and the court of appeal's ruling that section 7 of the

Missouri Constitution should be treated as coextensive with the federal Establishment
Clause; thus, determination of the federal constitutional question resolved the State

constitutional question. See supra note 108.

162. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 381 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1811 (1990).
163. Id. at 378-80.
164. Id. at 380-81.
165. Id. at 379 ("[W~e conclude the District's no-dancing rule on its face satisfies
the controlling Lemon standards.") (emphasis added).
166. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 378 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1811 (1990).

1990:119]

CLA YTON V. PLACE

a question of law was raised when one had to choose between
competing rules, while all other determinations were questions of
fact. 167 Christopher Columbus Langdell believed that law was something permanent and general while fact was something "transitory or
particular" and changed from case to case.'6 Probably the clearest
way to make the distinction is that a question of fact asks what is,
while a question of law asks what ought to be. 69 The district court,
as the trier of fact, determined what "is" the reality in the public
schools of Purdy, Missouri, while the Lemon test dictated what
"ought to be" the reality in the public schools of Purdy. If the Eighth
Circuit had followed the Supreme Court's mandate to mix the law
with the facts in Establishment Clause cases, it would have been
apparent that what "is" and what "ought to be" the situation in the
Purdy public schools were two completely different things.
By looking first to the face of the rule and concluding that it
was valid under Lemon, and second to the specific facts of the
Clayton case, the court of appeals separated rather than mixed the
law under Lemon with the facts of Clayton. 70 Add to this the special
vigilance the United States Supreme Court has exercised in deciding
Establishment Clause cases involving the public schools 7' and the
decision of the court of appeals becomes even more suspect.
Looking more closely at the decision, the structure of the Eighth
Circuit's analysis was problematic in that it raised a presumption of
the no-dancing rule's constitutionality before it addressed those arguments posed to show that the rule was unconstitutional. 72 This is
the equivalent of putting the cart before the horse. If anything, in
cases involving Establishment Clause challenges to action inside the
public schools, the United States Supreme Court has done everything
short of presuming such acts to be unconstitutional by consistently
striking down challenged action inside the public schools. Inside the
public schools, the Court has prohibited: religious instruction, prayer,
a ban on teaching evolution, and the posting of the Ten Command-

167. Monahan & Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Estab-

lishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 479-80 (1986).

168. Id. at 480.

169. Id. at 489-90.
170. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 379 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.

Ct. 1811 (1990). ("We turn now to the core of plaintiffs' additional argument
challenging the rule.").
171. See supra notes 91-104 and accompanying text.
172. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1811 (1990).
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ments.'7 The Court has been especially vigilant in overseeing compliance with the Establishment Clause in the public schools and has
strictly scrutinized governmental acts which suggest a denominational
preference. 7 4 Yet, the Eighth Circuit spent the first half of its analysis
concluding that the rule was permissible under Lemon and then
proceeded to dismiss the arguments raised against the rule in light of
the fact that the rule was constitutional.'7
The court of appeals found no support for the proposition that
a rule which otherwise conformed with Lemon, became unconstitutional due only to its harmony with the religious preferences of the
officials taking action. 76 Instead of addressing the findings of the
district court concerning religious influences on the School Board
after a determination that the rule conformed to Lemon, the court of
appeals should have used those findings to help make a determination
of secular purpose and primary effect under Lemon, because, as the
court of appeals itself pointed out, the constitutional inquiry in
77
Clayton was a mixed question of law and fact. 1
Turning to a closer analysis of the substance of the Eighth
Circuit's decision, as has already been noted, the resolution of many
constitutional questions in this area come down to a matter of degree
and involve an application of the law to the particular facts of each
case in order to determine if the challenged action violates the
Constitution. 78 In concluding that the no-dancing rule had a secular

purpose, the court of appeals focused on the fact that social dancing
is a "wholly secular activity.' ' 79 The question here was not whether
social dancing, a common activity in all parts of the country, including
Purdy, is a secular activity, for it clearly is. For the most part, social
dancing is not condemned by Judeo-Christian moral or ethical standards.'10 It cannot even be argued that social dancing was condemned
by local community standards in Purdy because school children were
173. See supra notes 91-104 and accompanying text.
174. Edwards v. Aquillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987); see also County of

Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3109 (1989).

175. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1811 (1990).

176. Id. at 380.
177. Id. at 378-81.
178. Id. at 378. Because of their nature, Establishment Clause inquiries tend to

be fact specific, mixed questions of fact and law.
179. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 379 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.

Ct. 1811 (1990).
180. Id. ("Condemnation of dancing is not firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian
moral or ethical standards.").
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allowed to hold social dances outside of the public schools.',' The
focus here should have been on the fact that a common social activity,
engaged in at homecoming dances and school proms all over the
country, 8 2 not only was prohibited in the public schools of Purdy but
also happened to be against the religious beliefs of what the court 8of3
appeals found to be the controlling majority in the same community.
Thus, in determining the purpose of the rule, one must not look sblely
at the activity but also at the prohibition of that activity in order to
a wholly
investigate its true purpose. Sometimes the act of restricting
4
secular activity can have a "holy," religious purpose.'8
An example of this was a prohibition on teaching evolution
science in the public schools.' The theory of evolution, on its face,
has nothing to do with religion. Yet, the Supreme Court in Epperson
v. Arkansas' 6 struck down a prohibition on teaching evolution science
in the public schools because prohibiting such a secular activity had
religious implications.
The Eighth Circuit found that the no-dancing rule had a secular
purpose despite the contrary conclusion of the district court. 7 A
particularly interesting finding by the trial court was that the School
Board allowed individuals to rent school space for nonschool activities
such as sporting events. 8 Some of the secular reasons given for
continuing the enforcement of the rule were concerns over money,
student supervision, and using up classroom time for extracurricular
events.'8 9 Yet, when parents asked to rent school premises, as others

181. Id. at 378. One School Board member stated that he felt he may be a
hypocrite for allowing his children to dance outside of school premises while he
simultaneously opposed changing the no-dancing policy in the public schools. Clayton
v. Place, 690 F. Supp. 850, 852 (W.D. Mo. 1988), rev'd, 884 F.2d 376 (8th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990).
182. See generally R. KRAus & S. CRAPmAN, HISTORY OF THE DANCE N ART
AND EDUCATION (2d ed. 1981).
183. Both the court of appeals and the district court referred to the result of
the vote taken at the March Board meeting concerning the no-dancing rule as a
reflection of "the reasoning of the 'majority' of townspeople, including the[ir]
strongly-held religious views." See Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 380 (8th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990) (quoting Clayton; 690 F. Supp. at 855).
184. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
185. Id.
186. Supra notes 94-5 and accompanying text.
187. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 379 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1811 (1990).
188. Clayton v. Place, 690 F. Supp. 850, 853-54 (W.D. Mo. 1988), rev'd, 884
F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990).
189. Id. at 855.
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had done for sporting events, in order to conduct a dance, the School
Board suspended its rental policy even though allowing the dance
would not have conflicted with any of the School Board's secular
goals. 190 Disallowing use of the schools for one secular activity,
dancing, while allowing such use for other secular activities, like
sports, in a community where religious leaders frown on social
dancing, indicates a wholly religious purpose for a ban on dancing
rather than any secular purpose.
The court of appeals, in addressing the purpose prong of Lemon,
chose to concentrate on the text of the rule while ignoring statements
made by School Board members which indicated a religious purpose
to the continued enforcement of the policy.' 9' For example, the School
Board President stated, "you'd better hope there's never separation
of God and school." Board member Terry said he would vote in
favor of keeping the no-dancing rule because when he voted to rescind
the rule in the past he caught a good deal of "flak" from the
ministers. Board member Keeling stated that he was taught dancing
was wrong and thus supported the rule and Board member Negre
92
acknowledged that his church did not approve of dancing.
In finding that the no-dancing rule was permissible under the
purpose prong of Lemon, the court of appeals relied on Wallace v.
Jaffree, 93 where the United States Supreme Court stated that a statute
is valid under Lemon if it has a clearly secular purpose. 94 Ironically,
in Wallace, in order to determine the purpose of a state statute
authorizing a one minute period of silence in the public schools, the
Supreme Court considered the statements made by the statute's main
proponent, Alabama State Senator Donald Holmes, who admitted that
the law was an attempt to bring voluntary prayer back to the public
schools.' 95 Likewise, in determining the purpose of continuing the nodancing policy, the Eighth Circuit should have considered the prior
statements of the School Board members,' 96 along with other evidence, 197

190. Id. at 853-54.
191. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 379 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1811 (1990). See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
192. Clayton, 690 F. Supp. at 852-53. See supra note 121 and accompanying
text.
193. 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985), cited with approval in Clayton, 884 F.2d 379. See
supra note 98 and accompanying text.
194. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
195. Id. at 56-57.
196. See supra note 121.
197. Besides the statements of the Board members there was evidence concerning
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instead of solely looking to the text of the no-dancing rule to make
98
its determination.1
The court of appeals found that no religious doctrine was principally or primarily advanced by the no-dancing policy. 99 Borrowing
from Lynch, the Eighth Circuit stated that "any arguably religious
effect of the rule is indirect, remote, and incidental." ' 200 The court
simply did not support this conclusion in its decision. It did not
indicate why any religious effect was at best remote or indirect except
to state that the students were allowed to dance outside school
premises. 20' That fact not only begged the question but raised a
suspicion of why the School District would not allow dancing to also
take place chaperoned, organized, and controlled on school premises. 20 2 The answer to both the question and the suspicion raised is
that the only place a religiously influenced School Board can force
young people not to dance is inside the schools they control. If a
religious organization wishes to combine religious indoctrination with
education, it is free to open its own sectarian schools. When religious
groups are allowed to dictate public school policy, they receive all the
benefits of using the schools for religious indoctrination while the
taxpayer foots the bill. This is not only a violation of the Establishment Clause but is patently unfair to the taxpayers who do not have
the same beliefs as the religious majorities which make public school
policy.
The court rejected the claim that "the rule impermissibly endorses
or conveys a message of governmental preference for a particular
religious viewpoint concerning social dancing.' '203 It reached this

the suspension of the school rental policy when parents attempted to rent school
premises for a dance, evidence that local ministers pressured School Board members
to retain the rule, evidence that the School District Superintendent was in favor of
discontinuing the policy, and evidence that the policy had resulted in school "proms"
being held off of school premises and at times as far as 60 miles outside of Purdy.
Clayton v. Place, 690 F. Supp. 850, 851-54 (W.D. Mo. 1988), rev'd, 884 F.2d 376
(8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990).
198. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 379 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1811 (1990).
199. Id.
200. Id. (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984)).
201. Id.
202. See Clayton v. Place, 690 F. Supp. 850, 855 (W.D. Mo. 1988), rev'd, 884
F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990) (school Superintendent
stated he could handle any chaperoning problems).
203. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 379 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1811 (1990).
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conclusion without a discussion of the facts in this particular case
even after having stated that "[tihe ultimate conclusion of the rule's
2
constitutionality, however, is a mixed question of law and fact."
In looking solely to the text of the no-dancing rule to evaluate
the effect of the School Board's action, the court of appeals ignored
a recent mandate from the United States Supreme Court. 205 Evaluation
of the effect of governmental action under the Establishment Clause
must include a determination of whether the "challenged . . .action
is . .. likely to be perceived by [members] . . . of the controlling

denominations as an endorsement" of their religious beliefs, and by
nonmembers as a disapproval of their religious beliefs. 20 6 Had the
court of appeals looked beyond the face of the no-dancing rule and
to the facts of the case, it would have seen how a School Board policy
which allows school premises to be rented for nonschool softball
2°
leagues and donkey basketball games but not rented for dancing W
could be perceived as a disapproval of those who believed that social
dancing was not a sin.
Before concluding that the no-dancing rule was permissible under
the effect prong of Lemon, the Eighth Circuit did not indicate why it
believed the rule did not endorse the religious choice of the controlling
denominations in Purdy (i.e., the "Ministerial Alliance's" belief that
social dancing is a sin) nor did the court state why the rule was not
perceived by nonadherents as a disapproval of their choice to dance.
Presumably this followed from the Eighth Circuit's determination that
social dancing was a "wholly secular activity," the prohibition of which
did not violate the Establishment Clause." However, the prohibition

204. Id. at 378.
205. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086,

3103 (1989).

Since Lynch, the Court has made clear that, when evaluating the effect of
government conduct under the Establishment Clause, we must ascertain
whether "the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be
perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement,
and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious
choices."
Id. (quoting School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390
(1985)).
206. Id.
207. Clayton v. Place, 690 F. Supp. 850, 854 (W.D. Mo. 1988), rev'd, 884 F.2d
376 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990).
208. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 379 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1811 (1990).
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of a "wholly secular activity," like the teaching of evolution science,
can indeed violate the Establishment Clause.m
Finally, in addressing the third prong under Lemon, the court of
appeals acknowledged that the political divisiveness component of the
third prong under Lemon only applied to cases involving financial aid
to parochial schools and thus dismissed the district court's finding on
this ground. 10
As for governmental entanglement with religion, the courts must
look at the character and purpose of institutions which governmental
action benefits, the type of aid the government is providing, and the
relationship between government and the religious institution which
follows.2 1' It is clear that this prong of the Lemon test prohibits the
entanglement of "the state in details of administration" of religious

institutions .212

The problem with entanglement in this case ran in the opposite
direction. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in Walz v. Tax
Commission, recognized the danger of excessive church involvement in
governmental affairs when he stated, "[t]he hazards of churches supporting government are hardly less in their potential than the hazards
of government supporting churches; each relationship carries some
involvement rather than the desired insulation and separation.''213
Religious groups in Purdy have excessively entangled themselves in the
affairs of government. As the court of appeals pointed out, religious
groups, like any other group, have the right to participate in influencing
decisions made by government. 21 4 However, the Constitution through
the Establishment Clause limits the extent to which government may
act pursuant to those influences which seek to promote religion. 215 The
202. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (holding statute that prohibited teaching of evolution in the public schools violated the Establishment Clause).
210. Clayton, 884 F.2d at 379 (8th Cir. 1989). See also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487
U.S. 589, 617 n.14 (1988); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 n.ll (1983); Carter
v. Broadlawns Medical Center, 857 F.2d 448, 456 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1096 (1989); Florey v. Sioux Falls School District 49-5, 619 F.2d 1311, 1318
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980). See supra note 64 for the holdings in
these cases.
211. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
212. Id.

213. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970) (footnote omitted).
214. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 380-81 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 1811 (1990).
215. Many groups, particularly special interests groups like the National Rifle
Association and the American Medical Association, use their right to influence
governmental decision making to promote their own interests. However, the Estab-
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Constitution requires that governmental acts have a clearly secular
purpose2 6 and that such acts do not have the primary effect of
endorsing the beliefs of the influencing religious denominations at the
expense of disapproving the beliefs of those who are unable to influence
governmental policy. 217 In short, religious majorities cannot use their
political muscle to involve government in endorsing their religious
teachings.2 1 Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit found in Clayton that the
no-dancing rule was permissible under all three prongs of the Lemon
219
test .
Once the court had determined that the no-dancing rule was
constitutional under the controlling Lemon criteria, it was easy to
dismiss the plaintiffs' arguments concerning the rule's religious purpose,
its religious effect and the excessive church entanglement in governmental affairs. , 20 After the court of appeals had found that the nodancing rule's purpose and effect were permissible under Lemon, it
followed that any religious participation influencing the decision to
keep the rule was also permissible since religious groups have the right
to influence secular decisions made by government."' Thus, the initial
conclusion by the Eighth Circuit that the rule, on its face, passed the
Lemon test indicated a failure to fully apply the law to the facts of
this case as required by Lemon. 22 For example, when the court
addressed the "facts" that School Board members had made statements
which indicated they supported the rule because of religious reasons,
lishment Clause specifically prohibits the use of government to promote religious
interests. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
216. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55-56 (1985).
217. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086,
3103 (1989) (quoting School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 390 (1985)).
218. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Establishment Clause
protects religious liberty and government infringes on that liberty when it puts its
power and prestige behind a particular religious belief) (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
219. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 378-79 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 1811 (1990).

220. Id. at 379-81.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 379. After applying each of the three prongs under Lemon to the
no-dancing rule, the court of appeals stated: "we conclude the District's no-dancing
rule on its face satisfies the controlling Lemon standards. We turn now to the core
of plaintiffs' additional argument challenging the rule." The court then "turned to"
the "record in this case" after already concluding that the rule was permissible under
the controlling law. Such an analysis separated, rather than mixed, the law and the
facts of this particular case. Id. at 379-81.
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the court responded that it "believe[d] plaintiffs' and the district court's
reliance on them in this case [was] misplaced." 2 3 What could be more
indicative of religious purpose than admissions by the those enforcing
the rule that they were motivated by religion?n4 By first raising a
presumption of the rule's constitutionality by looking only to the face
of the no-dancing rule, and then refusing to apply the most important
facts of this case to the controlling law, the Eighth Circuit did not
properly analyze this case by truly looking at the law and the facts at
hand at the same time.
C.

IMPACT: DANCING TODAY, FOOD TOMORROW

1.

Trends
The main trend in constitutional law involving the Establishment
Clause is Justice O'Connor's "endorsement test." 225 This test analyzes
the challenged governmental action within its entire context in order to
determine whether the action makes "adherence to a religion relevant
in any way to a person's standing in the political community." 226 The
"endorsement test" accepts the reality that governments at times must
acknowledge religion when they make law and policy. 227 For example,
statutes which prohibit murder cannot be invalidated under the Establishment Clause just because they conform to some religious teachings. 2 The crucial question under the "endorsement test" is whether
the government has used its power and influence to convey a message
that a religion or a particular religious belief is preferred. 229 One way
government may violate the Constitution by making religion relevant
or by endorsing religion is when government becomes excessively
entangled with religious institutions. 230 A second way is by governmental
23
endorsement or disapproval of religion. '
Where Lemon would look for secular purpose, O'Connor would
ask "whether the [government's intention was] to convey a message of
endorsement or disapproval of religion.' '232 Under the effect prong of
Lemon, O'Connor's inquiry would be whether intentionally or uninten223. Id. at 380.

224. See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
225. See generally Smith, Symbols, Perceptions and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the 'No Endorsement' Test, 86 MicH. L. REv. 266 (1987).
226. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

227. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 70.
229. Id.
230. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
231. Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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tionally, the government action has the effect of communicating a
message of endorsement or disapproval of religion. 233 As with Lemon,
excessive governmental entanglement with religious institutions would
also result in such governmental action being unconstitutional.2- Though
the majority of the Supreme Court has not adopted O'Connor's
formulation of the "endorsement test" her analysis was utilized in one
of the Court's most recent Establishment Clause decisions which indicated at least a recognition of the "no endorsement" approach. 235
2. Implications
The Eighth Circuit's decision stands for the proposition that the
prohibition of a "wholly secular activity" is constitutionally permissible
under the Lemon test. 236 This ruling could have far reaching implications
in school districts throughout the Eighth Circuit and beyond. The
court's decision does not recognize that a negative act or a restriction
may have the same effect as a positive act or requirement .237 This can
be especially true when the subject is religion where so many religious
groups use restrictions as well as requirements in indoctrinating, and
influencing members, with their beliefs.
By analogy, under the Eighth Circuit's ruling, a public school
district, which was predominantely conservative Roman Catholic could
pass a school district rule "prohibiting" the serving or consumption of
meat in the public school cafeterias on Fridays during Lent. Likewise,
a mostly orthodox Jewish community could forbid the serving of pork
in its public school cafeterias and a community consisting of a majority
of Mormons could use its right to influence secular decisions by banning
tea and coffee from their own public schools. 23s The Eighth Circuit
should agree that eating and drinking, at least as much as dancing, 239
233. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

234. See id. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
235. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086,
3103 (1989).
236. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 379 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1811 (1990).
237. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1987) (Arkansas statute which
prohibited the teaching of evolution was struck by the Court; this is a good example
of the effect of negative acts or restrictions).
238. THE DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF THE
LATTER-DAY SAINTS § 89 (1988) (church doctrine prohibits the consumption of hot
beverages and anything which is prone to cause addiction).
239. Although both eating and dancing can take on religious meaning, especially
when done in performance of rituals or sacraments, the activity of social dancing
cannot be any more secular than the eating of a hamburger or pork chop or the
drinking of coffee.
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are "wholly secular activities," and thus the prohibition of such
activities is not in violation of the Establishment Clause.
It is not difficult to come up with secular reasons for restricting
the consumption of fatty meats or coffee and tea. Secular reasoning
behind such restrictions could include concerns over health and money.
The point here is that restrictions often times have the same, if not a
more powerful, effect as requirements. For example, prohibiting the
teaching of evolution in the public schools2 " is just as effective a tool
of religious indoctrination as is the posting of the Ten Commandments
in public school classrooms.24 Though one is a negative act and the
other a positive one, the result of government involving itself in religious
promotion is the same. Courts will need to look very carefully at
prohibitions of "wholly secular activities," together with all the facts
surrounding the enactment and enforcement of such prohibitions in the
public schools, to truly determine if the underlying rule has a clearly
secular purpose and does not advance or inhibit religion in its principal
or primary effect.
3. Suggestions
One of the problems with this case is that there is no history of
the original enactment of the no-dancing rule.2 2 Given this, it is difficult
to determine the rule's purpose without any indication of the underlying
reasons for its adoption. In quoting Justice Steven's concurring opinion
3
in Washington v. Davis,2A
the court of appeals chose to delete a part
2
of the statement " which seems to be very important when one is
talking about the legal presumption that one intends "the natural
consequences of his deeds." 24 The part the court of appeals chose to
delete stated, "[i]t is unrealistic . . . to require the victim of alleged
discrimination to uncover the actual subjective intent of the decisionmaker.''2" Justice Stevens acknowledged that it can be very difficult
240. Epperson, 393 U.S. 97, 98 (1987).
241. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
242. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 378 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1811 (1990).
243. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding a qualifications test for police officers
under which a higher percentage of blacks failed as compared to whites).
244. Id. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring). The entire quote reads, "It is unrealistic,
on the one hand, to require the victim of alleged discrimination to uncover the actual
subjective intent of the decisionmaker or, conversely, to invalidate otherwise legitimate
action simply because an improper motive affected the deliberation of a participant
in the decisional process."
245. Id.
246. Id.
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to discover a decisionmaker's real purpose if she chooses to hide it.
In the instant case, the plaintiffs were trying to show that the
intentions of the School Board were to advance the religious teachings
of those who believed social dancing was sinful.27 This, under Lemon,
required a showing of purpose. 24 Black's Law Dictionary defines
"cause" as a "reason for an action or condition."' ' 9 If purpose can
be said to be the equivalent of reason and, thus, the same as cause, it
may be desirable to apply a "sine qua non" or "but for" analysis to
the purpose prong of the Lemon test. 2 0 Under this approach, the
causation or the purpose leading to governmental action could be
disclosed by asking: but for the desire to advance or inhibit religion,
would this rule or statute exist?
This approach isolates the truly secular reasons supporting the
governmental action and the courts would be better able to evaluate a
rule's purpose for Lemon, especially in cases like Clayton where there
was no history of the rule's enactment.25 1 By analogy once again, if a
predominantly Catholic community passed a public school district rule
prohibiting the serving or consumption of meat in public school
cafeterias on Fridays during Lent, the purpose inquiry under this
approach would ask, "but for the desire to advance the teachings of
the Catholic Church, would this rule exist?" If a predominantely Jewish
school district chose to prohibit pork in the public school cafeterias the
question would be, "but for the desire to advance the teachings of the
Jewish faith, would the prohibition exist?" Likewise, if a mostly
Mormon community banned coffee and tea from public school premises, the inquiry would be, "but for the desire to advance the religious
teachings of the Mormons, would the ban exist?" If in any of the
above cases the reviewing court answered yes, the result would be an
isolation of one or more truly secular purposes or reasons for the
existence of such prohibitions.
In Clayton, the question is, "but for the desire to advance the
religious teachings of the controlling religious majority in Purdy, would

247. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 377-78 (8th Cir. 1989).
248. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.

249. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 221 (6th ed. 1990).
250. W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 266 (5th ed. 1984).

251. Id. The "but for" approach does not conclusively determine purpose where
there are in fact concurrent causes leading to the challenged governmental action.
Nonetheless, if there are concurrent causes (i.e., both religious and secular reasons
for the existence of the action), by asking "but for the religious reasons" it becomes
easier to focus on the other underlying reasons for the rule and thus it becomes easier
to determine if the government action in fact has a clearly secular purpose.
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there be a public school rule which prohibits the use of school premises
for social dancing?" Given the fact that school premises are used for
other extracurricular and nonschool functions, such as softball leagues
and donkey basketball games, 1 2 the answer to the above "but for"
inquiry must be no.
V.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court has struggled with two competing interests in Establishment Clause cases: the realistic need for
governmental accommodation of religion and the political and constitutional ideal of separation of church and state. Though there are
many situations in which government should accommodate religion, in
cases involving challenged action in the public schools, where students
are of many faiths or no faith at all, are of impressionable age and
are in school involuntarily, the courts must follow United States
Supreme Court precedent which has built a wall of separation between
church and state.
Public school boards are governmental entities and as such their
power to make policy is limited by the commands of the Establishment
Clause of the first amendment of the United States Constitution. This
Clause, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, prohibits
the use of the public school system for religious indoctrination, whether
this indoctrination is accomplished by positive requirements such as
prayer or through negative restrictions such as a ban on the teaching
of evolution.
In' Clayton, the Eighth Circuit, looking first only to the face of
Purdy's no-dancing rule, and second to the facts of the case at hand,
separated, rather than mixed, the controlling law under Lemon with
the facts in Clayton. Thus the true purpose and effect of the nodancing rule were ignored and the rule improperly upheld. Had the
court of appeals looked to both the text and the surrounding circumstances in analyzing the no-dancing rule under Lemon, it would have
found, as did the district court, that the no-dancing policy was a
violation of the Establishment Clause.
PAUL

T.

DONAHUE

252. Clayton v. Place, 690 F. Supp. 850, 853-54 (W.D. Mo. 1988), rev'd, 884
F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990).

